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I. INTRODUCTION
In a national issue of first impression for the circuit courts,1 the
Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Louis, held that a federally licensed
firearm dealer who knowingly sells a firearm to a convicted felon should
not receive additional punishment for abusing a position of public or
private trust under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines).2 Under
Louis, a licensed firearm dealer does not occupy a position of trust as
defined in Guidelines § 3B1.3.3 The court relied upon the limited
discretion the victim—the federal government, as a representative of the
people—gave to the dealer to sell firearms.4 Citing the government’s
extensive oversight and documentation of firearm dealers, the Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that highly regulated firearm dealers lack discretion on
how to exercise many aspects of their businesses.5 Therefore, the firearm
dealer lacks a position of trust.
The issue is narrow in scope. Because the Guidelines provide a specific
base offense level6 for anyone who sells a firearm to a convicted felon, a
licensed dealer and a black market dealer would receive the same
recommended sentence if not for the imposition of the abuse of trust
enhancement under Guidelines § 3B1.3.7 Although the result of both
crimes is a convicted felon unlawfully possessing a firearm, licensed
1. See United States v. Louis, 559 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2009). A Seventh Circuit
concurring opinion previously considered the issue although counsel did not raise it on appeal. See
United States v. Podhorn, 549 F.3d 552, 561–65 (7th Cir. 2008) (Ripple, J., concurring).
2. Louis, 559 F.3d at 1227–28.
3. Id. at 1228.
4. Id. at 1227–28.
5. Id.
6. The “base offense level” is the starting point for a Guidelines sentence calculation. It is
controlled by the most serious crime of conviction. See ROGER W. HAINES, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK: TEXT AND ANALYSIS 18 (West 2009–2010 ed.).
7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) (2008) (suggesting a base
offense level of twenty for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2006), which provides, “It shall be
unlawful for any person to sell . . . any firearm . . . to any person knowing or having reasonable
cause to believe that such person . . . (1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court
of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year[.]”).
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dealers enjoy legal access and authority to import, manufacture, and deal in
firearms, while unlicensed dealers lack such authority.8 Thus, due to the
legal sanction and ease with which licensed dealers may access firearms,
repeated licensed dealer violations present a greater threat to society. Why,
then, does the Eleventh Circuit not hold a licensed firearm dealer, who
enjoys the reliance of the community as a gatekeeper9 of illegal firearm
disbursement, more accountable than an unlicensed citizen who enjoys no
such reliance? Does such a dealer not violate public trust?
If this issue had been presented to the Third Circuit, the outcome would
probably differ. In a factually analogous 2009 case, United States v.
Starnes,10 the Third Circuit subjected a subcontractor performing asbestos
demolition to the abuse of trust enhancement for falsifying air monitoring
reports required by the federal government.11 Instead of following the
Eleventh Circuit’s approach—which relied exclusively on the professional
discretion the victim gave the defendant—Starnes used a hybrid approach.
To define a position of trust, the Starnes court considered: “‘(1) whether
the position allows the defendant to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2)
the degree of authority which the position vests in [the] defendant vis-á-vis
the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there has been reliance on
the integrity of the person occupying the position.’”12 In its conclusion, the
Starnes court heavily referenced the defendant’s personal authority over
the jobsite that made the defendant’s crimes difficult to detect by the
victim.13 However, Starnes omitted analysis of the strong oversight of
asbestos subcontractors exercised by the federal government through the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal agencies.14
Therefore, the Starnes court failed to consider the key—and exclusive—
factor in determining the existence of a position of trust—the level of
discretion the victim afforded the defendant.
Although the courts reached different conclusions, the facts of both
cases stood very similar.15 Because no direct individual victim existed, the
government, as a representative of the people, was the theoretical victim of
both crimes.16 Also, both defendants (1) specialized in vocations involving
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (2006) (“No person shall engage in the business of importing,
manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or importing or manufacturing ammunition, until he has filed
an application with and received a license to do so from the Attorney General.”).
9. See Louis, 559 F.3d at 1227–28.
10. 583 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2009).
11. Id. at 217.
12. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1192 (3d Cir.
1994)).
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Compare id. at 202–05, with United States v. Louis, 559 F.3d 1220, 1222–24 (11th Cir.
2009).
16. See Louis, 559 F.3d at 1228; Starnes, 583 F.3d at 204.
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dangerous products;17 (2) engaged in professions subject to extensive
oversight by the government;18 (3) knowingly violated criminal regulations
governing their trades;19 (4) enjoyed legal access to specifically regulated
vocations;20 and (5) exercised authoritative control, as owners, over their
businesses.21 Despite the similarities, the Eleventh and Third Circuits
reached opposite conclusions.
As the above cases illustrate, courts have struggled to find a consistent
approach to define “position of trust.” In each case, the defendant presents
to the court specific responsibilities and duties unique to his individual
circumstance.22 Accordingly, in deciding whether to impose the
enhancement, courts must look beyond the defendant’s formal title.23 Thus,
the courts must apply an approach to enhancement determination based on
the case’s facts.24 Currently, most circuits apply the professional discretion
approach exclusively, similar to Louis.25 However, the Second and Fourth
Circuits join the Third Circuit and employ hybrid approaches similar to
Starnes.26
Although the courts remain divided on the issue, two circuit courts have
recently refocused their attention on the commentary text of § 3B1.3 as
amended in 1993, overruled their own precedent, and adopted the
professional discretion approach to enhancement imposition.27 Because the
remaining approaches rest on precedent established before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission’s 1993 Amendment, the Second, Third, and
Fourth Circuits should abandon their hybrid approaches and adopt the
17. Louis, 559 F.3d at 1222 (firearms); Starnes, 583 F.3d at 203 (asbestos).
18. A firearm license requires dealers to comply with all state and local business laws, 18
U.S.C. § 923(d)(1)(F)(ii)(II) (2006); to maintain records on the disposition of firearms, id.
§ 923(g)(1)(A), (3)(A); to submit to warrantless inspection, id. § 923(g)(1)(B), (C); to give prompt
notice of theft to authorities, id. § 923(g)(6); to post the license at the business, id. § 923(h); and to
refrain from transacting in a motor vehicle, id. § 923(j). United States v. Podhorn, 549 F.3d 552,
564 (7th Cir. 2008). Similarly, the EPA sets specific work-practice standards for the handling of
asbestos-related materials, 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.145, 61.150 (2010); and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) obligates asbestos contractors to monitor occupational exposure to
asbestos by collecting and analyzing on-site air samples, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1101 (2010). Starnes,
583 F.3d at 203.
19. See Louis, 559 F.3d at 1223; Starnes, 583 F.3d at 203.
20. Louis, 559 F.3d at 1222; Starnes, 583 F.3d at 202–03.
21. See Louis, 559 F.3d at 1222; Starnes, 583 F.3d at 203.
22. United States v. Britt, 388 F.3d 1369, 1372 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The determination of
whether a defendant occupied a position of trust is extremely fact sensitive.”).
23. United States v. Podhorn, 549 F.3d 552, 564 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The focus is not on formal
labels; instead, we ‘look to the relationship between the defendant and the victim and the level of
responsibility the defendant was given.’” (quoting United States v. Snook, 366 F.3d 439, 445 (7th
Cir. 2004))); United States v. Hernandez, 231 F.3d 1087, 1089 (7th Cir. 2000).
24. See Britt, 388 F.3d at 1372.
25. See infra notes 237–46 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 264–70 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Parts VI.A, VI.C (discussing the Ninth and Tenth Circuits).
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professional discretion approach exclusively.
This Note analyzes the prevalent judicial approaches to § 3B1.3 and
explains how some courts erred by advancing the hybrid approach after the
1993 Amendment to § 3B1.3. Part II examines the role of trust in guideline
sentencing. Part III discusses the policy behind the Guidelines, including
the continuing application of the Guidelines despite the Supreme Court’s
2005 United States v. Booker28 decision. Part IV explains different
approaches employed by the circuit courts to define a position of trust. Part
V highlights the effect of the approach by contrasting the Third Circuit’s
hybrid with the Eleventh Circuit’s professional discretion approach.
Finally, Part VI analyses the history of the enhancement and endorses the
recent trend towards the application of the professional discretion
approach.
II. TRUST AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
In his 2010 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama cited a
“deficit of trust” as the cause of many economic issues facing the nation.29
However, because scholars and professionals often reference trust as a
cause of business success or failure, the President’s statement about the
role of trust in the economy was not a novel proposition to the American
public.30
Throughout the Guidelines, examples abound of increased base level
offenses due to abuses of trust.31 However, strong societal disapproval of
abusers of trust is no contemporary phenomenon.32 For example, in Dante
Alighieri’s classic 14th Century poem The Inferno, God punishes fraud and
treason harsher than violence and heresy.33 Dante writes of a God who
encases flatterers, corrupt politicians, fraudulent advisors, and traitors in
the lowest two circles of hell.34 Outrage over abuses of trust continues
today. Perhaps the most infamous 21st Century example is the child

28. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
29. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address; see also
Richard Wolf, We Face a Deficit of Trust, USA TODAY, Jan. 28, 2010, at 1A.
30. See, e.g., John O. Whitney, The Economics of Mistrust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 687, 687 (2001)
(“Mistrust within organizations doubles costs, diverts attention from customers, stifles innovation,
and saps the vitality of the firm and its people.”).
31. See Joshua A. Kobrin, Placing Trust in the Guidelines: Methods and Meanings in the
Application of Section 3B1.3, the Sentence Enhancement for Abusing a Position of Trust, 12 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 121, 130 (2006).
32. See Paul G. Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante’s Inferno and the Social
Construction of Crime, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 787 (2001) (arguing that modern criminal law does
not adequately penalize the impact of betrayal).
33. See Chevigny, supra note 32, at 787.
34. See DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE INFERNO 147–49 (flatterers), 167–69 (corrupt politicians),
217–23 (fraudulent advisors), 275–77 (traitors) (Allan Gilbert trans., Duke Univ. Press 1969).
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molestation scandal that first rocked the Catholic Church in 2002.35 Other
recent abuses of trust include disgraced Wall Street financier Bernie
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme,36 Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s pay-forplay transactions,37 and Alaska Senator Ted Stevens’ home renovations.38
Ironically, criminal culture also condemns any perceived abuse of trust.
For example, the term “rat” long ago entered mainstream use to identify a
mafia insider who came forward as a witness or cooperated with police.39
In urban culture, the “stop snitching” campaign, a movement that threatens
violence against informants, has acquired a nationwide foothold.40 Even
inside police departments, fellow officers practice the “blue wall of
silence,” a code that forbids reporting another colleague’s misconduct.41
Additionally, trust plays a vital role in criminal sentencing. The
criminal justice system views betrayers of trust as more culpable than other
criminals.42 As the U.S. Sentencing Commission stated in Amendment
66643 to the Guidelines, “the Commission’s view [is] that offenders who
abuse their positions of public trust are inherently more culpable than those
who seek to corrupt them, and their offenses present a somewhat greater
threat. . . .”44 In Amendment 666 alone, the Commission increased the base
offense level for crimes that involved offering, giving, soliciting, or
receiving a bribe; offering, giving, soliciting, or receiving a gratuity; and
35. See, e.g., Matt Carroll et al., Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 6, 2002, at A1; Matt Carroll et al., Geoghan Preferred Preying on Poorer Children, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 7, 2002, at A1.
36. See Robert Frank et al., Madoff Jailed After Admitting Epic Scam, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13,
2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123685693449906551.html?mod=djema
lertNEWS; see also Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html?_r=1&hp.
37. See Jeff Coen et al., Blagojevich Arrested; Fitzgerald Calls It a ‘Political Corruption
Crime Spree’, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 2008, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-rodblagojevich-1209,0,7997804.story.
38. See Richard Mauer, Feds Eye Stevens’ Home Remodeling Project, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS (Alaska), May 29, 2007, http://www.adn.com/2007/05/29/46602/feds-eye-stevens-homeremodeling.html.
39. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1884 (1993).
40. The “stop snitching” campaign gained national notoriety in 2004 when Denver Nuggets
forward Carmelo Anthony appeared in a DVD produced by his childhood friends entitled Stop
Snitching. Tom Farrey, ‘Snitching’ Controversy Goes Well Beyond ‘Melo, ESPN THE MAG., Jan.
18, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=farrey_tom&id=2296590. Although
the creators of the DVD directed the message towards a particular West Baltimore drug kingpin who
became an informant, police recognize that the campaign has hampered their ability to convince
law-abiding citizens to come forward with helpful information. Id.
41. For a look into the code of silence within a police department, see Gabriel J. Chin & Scott
C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to
Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1998).
42. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 666 (effective Nov. 1, 2004).
43. Amendment 666 increased the base offense level for certain public corruption offenses.
Id. The Commission felt that “public corruption offenses previously did not receive punishment
commensurate with the gravity of such offenses.” Id.
44. Id.
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depriving the public of the intangible right to the honest services of public
officials.45
At bottom, all criminals abuse public trust in some manner. For
example, when entering a convenience store, a patron trusts that he will not
be robbed at knifepoint; when hailing a cab home in a city late at night, a
partygoer trusts that the cab driver is charging the regulated fee. The
Commission’s abuse of trust provisions concern not the normal
perpetrator46 but those who commit acts that undermine an organizational
foundation. For abuse of trust enhancements, the Commission’s paramount
concern is with damage to an organization or society as a whole, not
necessarily with damage to the individual directly affected by the crime.47
For example, although a custodian who sexually abuses a child in his care
inflicts the same level of damage to the molested child as a stranger who
commits the same crime, the custodian also undermines the public trust of
the custodial system. Thus, despite equal damage to the individual when
other perpetrators perform the same criminal acts, abusers of trust receive
harsher penalties because they undermine the systems and vocations that
they serve.
III. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. Seeking Uniformity: The Policy Behind the Guidelines
Prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the Act),48
district court judges enjoyed broad discretion over criminal penalties.49
Growing concern over sentencing disparity amongst similar offenses
prompted Congress to pursue reform.50 Prior to the establishment of the
Guidelines, statutes that provided only a maximum term of years or
monetary fine drove federal sentencing.51 As U.S. District Court Judge
Marvin Frankel52 famously wrote in his troubling 1973 book, Criminal
Sentences, Law Without Order or Limit, “the almost wholly unchecked and
45. Id.
46. See Kobrin, supra note 31, at 130.
47. See id.
48. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–59, 3561–66, 3571–74, 3581–86 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (2006)).
49. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225 (1993).
50. Id. at 228.
51. Id.
52. Judge Marvin Frankel served as a U.S. District Court Judge in the Southern District of
New York for fifteen years. Id. at 228. Senator Edward Kennedy, credited with introducing the first
sentencing reform bill in 1975, referred to Judge Frankel as the “‘father of sentencing reform.’” Id.
225, 228. In the 1950s, sentencing judges began to face criticism from both sides of the political
spectrum. Id. at 227. While critics on the left complained that (1) the rehabilitation attribute of
sentencing punishment remained impotent; (2) indeterminacy of their sentences led prisoners to
increased anxiety,; and (3) the disparity in sentencing stood at odds with equality ideals, critics on
the right complained that sentencing judges and parole officers were too lenient on criminals. Id.
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sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are
terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of
law.”53 These statutes left judges free to impose any sentence below the
maximum prescribed by Congress.54
With the passage of the Act in 1984, Congress established the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, an independent judicial agency composed of
seven voting members and two non-voting members,55 and delegated broad
authority to review the federal sentencing process.56 Congress sought to
achieve the goals of (1) establishing honesty; (2) creating reasonable
uniformity; and (3) achieving proportionality in federal sentencing.57
However, Congress failed to adopt any concrete punishment philosophy,
instead leaving the Commission to “reflect, to the extent practicable,
advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal
justice process[.]”58 Working with the directive codified in 28 U.S.C. § 991
to balance the competing goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation,59 the Commission submitted its initial Guidelines to
Congress in 1987, and after the prescribed period of congressional review,
the Guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987.60
B. The Pre-Booker Mandatory Imposition of Guideline Sentencing
Drawing on the need to limit sentencing disparity and, in turn, limit the
broad discretion of district court judges, Congress required judges to
impose sentences within the appropriate guideline ranges.61 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1) provides:
[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within
the range [of the applicable category of offense] unless the
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described. In determining whether a
53. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1972). “The central
purpose of this small volume is to seek the attention of literate citizens—not primarily lawyers and
judges, but not excluding them—for gross evils and defaults in what is probably the most critical
point in our system of administering criminal justice, the imposition of sentence.” Id. at vii.
54. See id.
55. HAINES, JR. ET AL., supra note 6, at 1.
56. Id.
57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2008).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (2006).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B); see also KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 52 (1998). For an argument that retributive
sentencing impedes meaningful reform, see Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61
FLA. L. REV. 727 (2009).
60. See HAINES, JR. ET AL., supra note 6, at 2. For a concise overview of the guidelines
sentencing process, see id. at 17–20.
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006); S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 79 (1983).
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circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the
court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing
Commission.62
Thus, a judge could only depart from the applicable sentencing range
for an “aggravating or mitigating circumstance.”63 In either circumstance,
the sentencing judge must cite a relevant fact that was not taken into
consideration by the Guidelines, but remains consistent with the
Commission’s sentencing policy.64 Proper reasons for an upward departure
include the psychological impact on a victim,65 an excessive history of
committing the same crime,66 and the vulnerability of a victim.67 Examples
of mitigating circumstances include a defendant’s vulnerability to abuse in
prison,68 a defendant’s withdrawal from criminal activity before arrest,69
and assistance from a third party.70 However, in most cases, aggravating
and mitigating departures are unavailable because the Commission
included most relevant factors in the Guidelines.71 For example,
premeditation is an impermissible reason for a departure because the
Commission has already accounted for it in the Guidelines.72 Thus, in the
vast majority of cases, the judge must impose a sentence within the
Guideline range.73 The mandatory nature of the Guidelines led to the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, which struck down
§ 3553(b)(1) for an “advisory” regime.74

62. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 3742(e) also depended on “the
Guidelines’ mandatory nature.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).
64. See id.
65. United States v. Lucas, 889 F.2d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding upward departure
where bank robber forced tellers and customers to disrobe).
66. United States v. Chase, 894 F.2d 488, 492 (1st Cir. 1990) (upholding upward departure
where a defendant committed fourteen bank robberies and the Guidelines lacked additional
penalties for robberies beyond five).
67. United States v. Melvin, 187 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding an upward
departure for the offense of trafficking in fraudulent credit card accounts where the defendant
obtained the accounts in the names of hospitalized children).
68. United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 603, 609 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant’s
“immature appearance, bisexual orientation and fragility” entitled him to a downward departure).
69. United States v. Buchanan, 213 F.3d 302, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district
court was obligated to consider the defendant’s withdrawal of criminal activity before his arrest).
70. United States v. Abercrombie, 59 F. Supp. 2d 585, 592 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (granting
downward departure where a third party’s assistance in an investigation was substantial and third
party would not have assisted the government if not for the defendant’s plight).
71. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005).
72. United States v. Kelly, 1 F.3d 1137, 1141 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that because
premeditation is the only distinguishing factor between first and second degree murder, an upward
departure for premeditation in a second degree murder conviction is improper).
73. Booker, 543 U.S. at 234.
74. See infra Part III.C.
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C. Guideline Relevance After Booker
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington,75 which
struck down Washington’s mandatory sentencing structure as a violation of
the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury, some commentators,
including Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, feared that based on the
majority’s analysis, the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
also unconstitutional.76 Two years later, in United States v. Booker, the
Supreme Court ended the compulsory nature of the Guidelines, striking
down as violations of the Sixth Amendment77 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1)78
and 3742(e),79 which dictated the mandatory implementation of the
Guidelines.80
The facts in Booker were abnormally egregious. The government
charged the defendant, Freddie Booker, with possession of at least fifty
grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute.81 After a jury returned a
guilty verdict, the Guidelines subjected Booker to a base sentence of no
more than 262 months in prison.82 However, at a post-trial sentencing
hearing, the district court judge found that Booker possessed an additional
566 grams of crack.83 The judge also found Booker guilty of obstructing
justice.84 Accordingly, Booker became subject to a new maximum sentence
of life in prison.85
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority in part, expressed
particular concern that the Guidelines allowed judges to determine facts

75. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
76. See id. at 325 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The structure of the Federal Guidelines
likewise does not . . . provide any grounds for distinction. . . . If anything, the structural differences
that do exist make the Federal Guidelines more vulnerable to attack.”).
77. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
78. Section 3553(b)(1) provides in pertinent part: “[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the
kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a
sentence different from that described.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006).
79. Section 3742(e) provides in pertinent part: “Upon review of the record, the court of
appeals shall determine whether the sentence . . . is outside the applicable guideline range,
and . . . the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on a factor that . . . is not
authorized under section 3553(b) . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) passim (2006).
80. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1988), Justice Harry A. Blackmun noted that
Congress settled on a mandatory-guideline system. Id. at 367. Justice Blackmun relied on the Senate
Judiciary Committee’s rejection of a proposal that would have enacted the guidelines as advisory.
Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 79 (1983).
81. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Based on the facts proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, Booker was eligible for
a maximum sentence of 262 months. Instead, the district court judge sentenced Booker to 360
months in prison, based on facts not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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relevant to sentencing without a decision by a jury.86 Five years prior to
Booker, the Court found this practice unconstitutional in Apprendi v. New
Jersey.87 Because Congress made the Guidelines mandatory and the
Guidelines promoted the finding of certain facts without the assistance of a
jury, the mandatory application provisions in the Guidelines were
unconstitutional.88 The Court reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi: “Any fact
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence
exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of
guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”89
According to Justice Stephen Breyer, who wrote the remedy opinion,
striking §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) made the Guidelines advisory:90 “So
modified, the federal sentencing statute . . . makes the Guidelines
effectively advisory. It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines
ranges, but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other
statutory concerns as well.”91 Additionally, Booker reaffirmed that the
circuit courts’ standard of review for sentencing decisions is a “review for
‘unreasonable[ness].’”92 Thus, while guideline consultation remains
86. Id. at 244.
87. 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000) (“[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does
the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s
guilty verdict?”).
88. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
89. Id.
90. In regard to the reconstruction of the statute, the Court will sometimes “sharply [bend] the
seemingly plain meaning of a statute in order to minimize the statute’s arguable unconstitutionality.”
Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REV. 945, 955 n.39 (2009).
91. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46 (internal citations omitted); see also Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007) (holding that sentencing judges have discretion to impose sentences
outside the guideline ranges in cases involving conduct related to manufacture, distribution, or
possession of crack cocaine).
92. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(C) (1994)). The sentencing
guidance given by the Supreme Court to the lower court is as follows:
[T]he Sentencing Commission remains in place, writing Guidelines, collecting
information about actual district court sentencing decisions, undertaking research,
and revising the Guidelines accordingly. . . . The district courts, while not bound
to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account
when sentencing. . . . The courts of appeals review sentencing decisions for
unreasonableness.
United States v. Valencia-Aguirre, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (citing Booker,
543 U.S. at 264). A practical understanding of “reasonable sentence,” however, provides a
“formidable task” for the lower courts:
[A]fter nearly twenty years of guidelines sentencing, after hundreds of judicial
opinions construing the guidelines, after scores of scholarly articles appraising the
supposed virtues and claimed vices of the guidelines, after the accumulation and
evaluation of volumes of data by the Sentencing Commission, and after protracted
deliberation by Congress, including the investment of a mountain of public
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mandatory for sentencing judges, Booker prevents mandatory strict
application of the Guidelines.93
Recent data suggests that, since Booker, guideline adherence is slowly
decreasing—the disparity between the mean guideline minimum and the
average imposed sentence appears to be growing.94 For example, in the
2004 fiscal year (pre-Booker), the median of the quarterly average sentence
length was 50.5 months95 and the median of the quarterly average guideline
minimum length was 59 months—a difference of 8.5 months.96 In fiscal
year 2009 (four years after Booker), the median of the quarterly average
sentence length was 47 months, while the mean guideline minimum length
was 57 months—a difference of 10 months.97 Because of the recency of
Booker, the question remains whether the disparity will continue to grow.
However, even opponents of the Guidelines acknowledge that the
Guideline regime, in some capacity, is here to stay.98
IV. PREVALENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO § 3B1.3
Section 3B1.3 of the Guidelines provides in pertinent part: “If the
defendant abused a position of public or private trust . . . in a manner that
significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense,
increase by 2 levels.”99 Thus, two threshold questions determine the
resources, the Supreme Court abruptly disengaged the most thorough and carefully
considered regime of criminal sentencing in history and (by the margin of one
vote) substituted a two-word regime of criminal sentencing (perhaps the most
abbreviated in history)—the regime of the “reasonable sentence,” now informed
only to some indeterminate and controversial extent by the Sentencing Guidelines.
Id. at 1364–65.
93. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.
94. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 2009, at 32
fig.C, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quarter
ly_Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2009_Quarter_Report_Final.pdf.
95. See E-mail from Timothy Drisko, Research Data Coordinator, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n,
to author (Jan. 27, 2011, 12:45 PM EST) (on file with author).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Evangeline A. Zimmerman, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Misplaced Trust in
Mechanical Justice, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 841, 867 (2010) (citing José A. Cabranes, The U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines: Where Do We Go From Here?, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 208, 208 (2000)
(“There is a well-nigh universal agreement that the general outlines of the current system are here to
stay. . . . The Guidelines have become deeply entrenched.”)).
99. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2010). The entire section reads as
follows:
If the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill,
in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the
offense, increase by 2 levels. This adjustment may not be employed if an abuse of
trust or skill is included in the base offense level or specific offense characteristic.
If this adjustment is based upon an abuse of a position of trust, it may be employed
in addition to an adjustment under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role); if this adjustment
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application of the abuse of trust enhancement.100 First, whether the
defendant held a position of public or private trust.101 If so, whether the
position of trust “significantly facilitate[d]” commission or concealment of
the offense.102
Courts find the answer to the second question easier than the first. As
§ 3B1.3 Application Note One describes, a nexus must exist between the
position of trust and the facilitation of the crime: “For this adjustment to
apply, the position of public or private trust must have contributed in some
significant way to facilitating the commission or concealment of the
offense (e.g., by making the detection of the offense or the defendant’s
responsibility for the offense more difficult).”103
In other words, the crime’s execution must benefit significantly from
the defendant’s position of trust. So long as the defendant used the position
of trust to further execute the crime, whether the defendant could have
executed the crime without the benefit of the trust position is irrelevant.104
For example, a court will probably withhold the enhancement for a
supervisor of elections convicted of a drug offense. However, a court will
is based solely on the use of a special skill, it may not be employed in addition to
an adjustment under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role).
Id. Courts apply the “special skill” enhancement distinct from the abuse of trust enhancement. See
id. The special skill enhancement rests outside the scope of this Note.
100. See id.; United States v. Contreras, 581 F.3d 1163, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in
part by 593 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (agreeing with the original three-judge
panel that ruled United States v. Hill and its progeny should be overruled).
101. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2010); Contreras, 581 F.3d at 1165–
66.
102. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2010); Contreras, 581 F.3d at 1165–
66.
103. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt n.1 (2010). Application Note One
reads in its entirety as follows:
“Public or private trust” refers to a position of public or private trust characterized
by professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment
that is ordinarily given considerable deference). Persons holding such positions
ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than employees whose
responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in nature. For this adjustment to
apply, the position of public or private trust must have contributed in some
significant way to facilitating the commission or concealment of the offense (e.g.,
by making the detection of the offense or the defendant’s responsibility for the
offense more difficult). This adjustment, for example, applies in the case of an
embezzlement of a client’s funds by an attorney serving as a guardian, a bank
executive’s fraudulent loan scheme, or the criminal sexual abuse of a patient by a
physician under the guise of an examination. This adjustment does not apply in the
case of an embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller or hotel clerk because
such positions are not characterized by the above-described factors.
Id.
104. United States v. Andrews, 484 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A] position of trust
significantly facilitates a crime when it makes the crime either easier to commit or more difficult for
others to detect.”).
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likely apply the enhancement if the supervisor of elections commits a voter
fraud offense.105
Although most “significant facilitation” questions lack such simplicity,
the questions are better settled than their counterparts. Answers to whether
the defendant occupied a position of public or private trust fluctuate
between circuits and even among courts within the same circuit.106 No
consistent judicial clarification to this question has existed since the
establishment of the Guidelines.107
The Commission provides the definition of “public or private trust” in
Application Note One of § 3B1.3: “‘Public or private trust’ refers to a
position of public or private trust characterized by professional or
managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is
ordinarily given considerable deference). Persons holding such positions
ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than employees
whose responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in nature.”108
At a minimum, the position of trust must stem from the defendant’s
relationship with the victim.109 That is, the victim must actively confer
trust upon the defendant, and the defendant must violate that trust.110 In the
“position of trust” realm, this seems to be the only statement in which
courts agree. Traditionally, courts use a number of approaches to decide
whether an individual occupies a position of trust.111 However, three
distinct approaches most frequently form the case law: (1) access and
authority; (2) difficult-to-detect; and (3) professional discretion.112 Many
courts employ combinations, or hybrids, of these three approaches and
others.113
105. See United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 819–20 (11th Cir. 2000).
106. See, e.g., infra note 119.
107. See Kobrin, supra note 31, at 132.
108. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2010). For the full text of
Application Note 1, see supra note 103.
109. United States v. Podhorn, 549 F.3d 552, 564 (7th Cir. 2008); see also United States v.
Hathcoat, 30 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 1994).
110. Podhorn, 549 F.3d at 564; see also Hathcoat, 30 F.3d at 919.
111. Some of the factors include:
(1) the defendant’s freedom to commit an easily concealed wrong, (2) whether an
abuse of the position can be readily detected, (3) duties of the position relative to
other employees, (4) level of specialized knowledge required for the job, (5) the
position’s authority, and (6) the level of trust placed in the position by the public.
Brian Hendricks, Note, In Pursuit of Environmental Regulatory Compliance: Should We Flex the
“Public Trust” Enhancement Muscle?, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 169
(2005).
112. See Kobrin, supra note 31, at 131–49.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Dullum, 560 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v.
Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[F]actors include: (1) whether the defendant had
either special duties or ‘“special access to information not available to other employees’”; (2) the
extent of discretion defendant possesses; (3)[ ]whether the defendant’s acts indicate that he is
‘“more culpable” than others’ who are in positions similar to his and who engage in criminal acts;
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A. Access and Authority
Under the access and authority approach, the application of § 3B1.3
relies on the amount of access an employee has to the actions or items that
led to the law breaking.114 The relevant question is “whether trust is
inherent to the nature of the position.”115 The theory behind the access and
authority approach is that, if significant authority and access authority are
given to an employee, then the employee is exercising significant
“professional or managerial discretion”116 even though the employee may
not serve directly as a manager.117 Therefore, such an employee would be
subject to the enhancement for abusing a position of trust.
The Commission arguably provides support for the access and authority
approach in the definition of public or private trust: “Persons holding such
positions ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than
employees whose responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in
nature.”118 Although confusion reigns as to whether the access and
authority approach is sufficient, by itself, to implicate an abuse of public
trust,119 the Third,120 Fourth,121 and Seventh Circuits122 list access and
authority as factors in their determinations.
B. Difficult-to-Detect
The difficult-to-detect approach originated from the Ninth Circuit’s
United States v. Hill123 decision. In Hill, the defendant—an employeeand (4) viewing the entire question of abuse of trust from victim’s perspective.” (quoting United
States v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1192
(3d Cir. 1994) (noting that courts must consider, “(1) [W]hether the position allows the defendant
to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the degree of authority which the position vests in [the]
defendant vis-a-vis [sic] the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there has been reliance on
the integrity of the person occupying the position.”); United States v. Williams, 966 F.2d 555, 557
(10th Cir. 1992).
114. United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 419 (7th Cir. 1993).
115. United States v. Brelsford, 982 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1992).
116. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2008).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 1992) (non-managerial,
postal carriers).
118. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2008). But see infra text
accompanying notes 252–56.
119. Compare United States v. Dorsey, 27 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[Position of trust]
is characterized by ‘access or authority over valuable things.’ Of course, access or authority alone is
not sufficient.” (internal citation omitted)), with United States v. Frykholm, 267 F.3d 604, 612 (7th
Cir. 2001) (“[Position of trust enhancement] turns upon whether [the defendant] had ‘access or
authority over . . . valuable things.’”).
120. United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 217 (3d Cir. 2009).
121. United States v. Pitts, 176 F.3d 239, 246 (4th Cir. 1999).
122. Dorsey, 27 F.3d at 289.
123. 915 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled by United States v. Contreras, 581 F.3d
1163, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part by 593 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per
curiam) (agreeing with the original three-judge panel that ruled United States v. Hill and its progeny
should be overruled).
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driver for a national moving company—picked up furniture and household
goods for five military families who were relocating to Germany from
Missouri and Kansas.124 Instead of delivering the belongings to the Texas
routing point, Hill sold several of the items to various individuals around
Licking, Missouri.125 After a grand jury indictment and a guilty plea of
theft of an interstate shipment, the district court judge adjusted Hill’s base
offense level upward under § 3B1.3.126 Hill appealed the enhancement,
contending that the relationship between a truck driver and the owner of
the truck’s cargo does not give rise to a position of trust, especially because
he was merely a company employee and not specifically sought out by the
victims.127
In holding that the enhancement was proper, the Ninth Circuit gave
birth to the “difficult-to-detect” approach: “[T]he primary trait that
distinguishes a person in a position of trust from one who is not is the
extent to which the position provides the freedom to commit a difficult-todetect wrong.”128 The definition relies on (1) the victim’s objective ability
to determine the defendant’s honesty; and (2) the extent to which the
defendant’s activities can be easily observed.129 While the court found that
the families maintained an objective ability to determine Hill’s honesty
because they could compare the truck’s contents at the destination to its
contents prior to leaving the home, the families could not expediently
discover Hill’s activities because at the time of inspection, they would have
been in Germany.130
Thus, the theory behind the difficult-to-detect approach is that if a party
has the ability to take criminal advantage of another without quick
detection, then the party has established a position of trust.131 For nineteen
years, Hill reigned as the leading case for the difficult-to-detect approach
as well as the entire abuse of trust enhancement.132 Currently, the hybrid
approaches of the Second,133 Third,134 and Fourth Circuits135 still employ
elements of Hill’s difficult-to-detect approach.

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 504–05.
128. Id. at 506.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 506–07.
131. Id.
132. See United States v. Contreras, 581 F.3d 1163, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2009) (overruling Hill),
vacated in part by 593 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (agreeing with the original
three-judge panel that ruled United States v. Hill and its progeny should be overruled).
133. United States v. Hirsch, 239 F.3d 221, 227 (2d Cir. 2001).
134. United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 217 (3d Cir. 2009).
135. United States v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 1995).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss2/5

16

Griffin: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Abuse of Trust Enhancement: An

2011]

DISARMING THE ABUSE OF TRUST ENHANCEMENT

473

C. Professional Discretion
Under the professional discretion approach, the decisive factor is the
amount of managerial or professional discretion vested in the defendant by
the victim.136 The 1993 Amendment to § 3B1.3 provides direct, textual
authority for the professional discretion approach:137 “‘Public or private
trust’ refers to a position of public or private trust characterized by
professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary
judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference). Persons holding
such positions ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than
employees whose responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in
nature.”138
Often, professional or managerial discretion manifests itself in a
position requiring substantial training.139 One occupying such a position is
given considerable deference because victims often do not understand the
technical details of the position.140 Fiduciary relationships such as doctorpatient or lawyer-client easily fit this description.141 Additionally,
substantial discretionary judgment arises in relationships characterized by
an imbalance in power, such as guardian-ward relationships.142
On the other side of the spectrum, positions subject to extensive
oversight lack substantial discretionary judgment.143 An ordinary bank
teller provides an example of a position not ordinarily subject to the
enhancement.144 Although a bank teller may sometimes have the freedom
to act without detection, such a position lacks considerable deference:
An ordinary teller has no discretion with regard to his
dealings with the deposit; he is required by his position to
place it in the till. There is no element of discretionary
judgment in his position that would permit him to explain
properly the absence of that deposit in his till at the end of the
day.145
In contrast, a patient entrusts his doctor with significant discretion, and
“as a result of that discretion, [the doctor] has substantial opportunity to

136. United States v. Louis, 559 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Tribble,
206 F.3d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 2000).
137. United States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
138. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2008) (emphasis added).
139. See United States v. Podhorn, 549 F.3d 552, 563 (7th Cir. 2008) (Ripple, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
140. See id.
141. Id. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, Trust, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and Lessons
from Fiduciary Law, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1025 (2002) (analyzing the role of fiduciary law in the
Guidelines).
142. See Fairfax, supra note 141, at 1035.
143. Podhorn, 549 F.3d at 564–65 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2008).
145. Podhorn, 549 F.3d at 564–65 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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offer explanations for his criminal conduct . . . .”146 Thus, to occupy a
position of trust under the professional discretion approach, opportunity to
commit the crime must arise not only through difficult detection or broad
access but must also arise as a result of substantial discretionary
judgment.147
Cases such as Louis and Starnes, in which defendants own and operate
their own businesses subject to extensive government regulation, create
more difficult decisions for sentencing courts.148 On one hand, as the
owner of his own business, the defendant is subject to no managerial
oversight over daily operations. On the other hand, federal laws place strict
requirements on the operation of the business.149 In such cases, critical
evaluation of the victim’s specific relationship with the defendant often
informs the final determination.150 Thus, courts should evaluate whether a
defendant’s criminal opportunity arose as a result of substantial
discretionary judgment given by the victim.151
Although all circuit courts currently apply professional discretion as at
least one factor in their determination, the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits employ the professional
discretion approach exclusively.152
D. Specific Abuse of Trust Enhancements
Currently, Application Note Two provides two specific situations in
which a court must apply the enhancement.153 In other words, despite the
applicable circuit court’s interpretation of position of trust, if a sentencing
judge is faced with a defendant who qualifies under either situation, the
judge must apply the enhancement.154 The enhancement specifically
applies to “[a]n employee of the United States Postal Service who engages
in the theft or destruction of undelivered United States mail” and to “[a]
defendant who exceeds or abuses the authority of his or her position in
order to obtain unlawfully, or use without authority, any means of
identification.”155The Commission initially included the postal service
employee enhancement in the 1993 Amendment to the Guidelines.156 The
Commission’s official “Reason for Amendment” reads, “This amendment
reformulates the definition of an abuse of position of trust to better
distinguish cases warranting this enhancement.”157 Although no longer
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 565 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
See infra Part V.B–C.
See infra Part V.D.
See infra Part V.D.
See Podhorn, 549 F.3d at 564–65 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See infra notes 238–46 and accompanying text.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.2 (2008).
See id.
Id.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 492 (effective Nov. 1, 2003).
Id.
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included in Application Note Two, the amendment instructed that the
Commission insert the language “because of the special nature of the
United States mail.”158 Seemingly, the Commission promulgated the
amendment to resolve a dispute between the courts as to whether low-level
postal employees occupied a position of trust.159
The Commission’s second automatic enhancement, “means of
identification,” resulted from a Congressional mandate in the Identity Theft
Penalty Enhancement Act (Identity Theft Act).160 The Identity Theft Act
created two new criminal offenses for aggravated identity theft, which
“prohibits the unauthorized transfer, use, or possession of a means of
identification of another person during, or in relation to, specific
enumerated felonies.”161 The Identity Theft Act called on the Commission
to “review and amend its guidelines and its policy statements to ensure that
the guideline offense levels and enhancements appropriately punish
identity theft offenses involving an abuse of position.”162 Additionally,
Congress specifically included a reference to § 3B1.3 for offenders who
abuse their position of trust to obtain or use an unlawful identification.163
The Commission responded with Application Note Two, which mandates
application of the abuse of trust enhancement if a defendant “exceeds or
abuses the authority of his or her position to obtain, transfer, or issue
158. Id.
159. Compare United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 421 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that a postal
letter carrier’s access to valuable mail was a direct result of his position and holding that he
occupied a position of trust), and United States v. Milligan, 958 F.2d 345, 347 (11th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting an argument that a postal position was the same as an ordinary bank clerk and applying
§ 3B1.3), with United States v. Tribble, 206 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing sentence
enhancement for a postal window clerk), and United States v. Cuff, 999 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir.
1993) (per curiam) (“[W]e fail to see any significant distinction between the bank teller who
embezzles funds and Cuff, who stole mail packages while employed in unloading them and moving
them into the workroom where other employees were located.”).
160. Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No.108-275, 118 Stat. 831 (2004); see
also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 677 (2008).
161. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 677 (2008). The first offense
created was an aggravated identity theft provision for those who used a false identification to carry
out certain enumerated offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(A)(a)(1) (2006). The second offense was aimed
specifically at terrorism:
Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in section
2332b(g)(5)(B), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority,
a means of identification of another person or a false identification document
shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of 5 years.
Id. § 1028A(a)(2).
162. § 5(a), 118 Stat. at 833.
163. § 5(b)(1), 118 Stat. at 833 (requiring the Commission to “Amend [Guidelines] section
3B1.3 . . . to apply to and punish offenses in which the defendant exceeds or abuses the authority of
his or her position in order to obtain unlawfully or use without authority any means of
identification . . . .”).
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unlawfully, or use without authority, any means of identification.”164 The
automatic enhancements are significant because they signal the willingness
of both Congress and the Commission to legislate or promulgate a more
specific approach to § 3B1.3 sentencing, if necessary. Thus, either body
could legislate or promulgate specific exceptions for federally licensed
firearm dealers or asbestos subcontractors.
V. WHY THE APPROACH MATTERS: RECENT ABUSE OF TRUST
DECISIONS
Recent circuit opinions highlight the importance of the approach to the
enhancement’s application. As discussed above, because of the differences
in approach, circuit courts are not applying the enhancement consistently to
similar facts. Thus, defendants receive different sentences based merely
upon jurisdiction. The following cases demonstrate recent examples.
A. United States v. Podhorn Concurrence: The Professional
Discretion Approach Prevents § 3B1.3 Enhancement for a
Licensed Firearm Dealer
In United States v. Podhorn,165 the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) obtained a search warrant for the business
premises of Paul Podhorn, a federally licensed firearm dealer.166 Pursuant
to the discoveries of the search, a jury convicted Podhorn of two counts of
selling stolen firearms, twenty-one counts of selling firearms without
maintaining proper records, and one count of failing to maintain proper
firearm records.167 Because Podhorn’s counsel failed to challenge the abuse
of trust enhancement on appeal, the majority decision did not address it.168
However, Judge Kenneth F. Ripple, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, chose to specifically address whether a federally licensed firearm
dealer occupies a position of trust.169
Citing Seventh Circuit precedent,170 Judge Ripple reasoned that the
imposition of § 3B1.3 is appropriate only if the victim places the offender
in a position of professional or managerial discretion, a position with the
type of substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given
considerable deference, and the offender abuses that discretion to carry out
the offense.171 According to this reasoning, the government was Podhorn’s
164. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.2 (2008).
165. 549 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2008).
166. Id. at 555.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 562 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Mr. Podhorn has not
contended that [a Federal Firearms License] is not a position of either public or private trust. An
argument not made on appeal is abandoned, and we need not consider it.” (citing United States v.
Venters, 539 F.3d 801, 809 (7th Cir. 2008))).
169. Id. at 563.
170. Id. at 563–64 (citing United States v. Hathcoat, 30 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 1994)).
171. Id.
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victim.172 Thus, in order to hold a position of trust, the government must
have placed the Federal Firearm License (FFL) holder, the defendant, in “a
position characterized by professional or managerial discretion.”173
Alternatively stated, the government must give the FFL holder a “position
with the type of substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given
considerable deference.”174
However, as Judge Ripple noted, the government provides an FFL
holder with very little discretionary power.175 Instead, the government
subjects an FFL holder to an extensive list of legal requirements, such as
complying with all firearms regulations of federal, state, and local law;
maintaining records of every disposition of every firearm; subjecting the
premises to inspection without reasonable cause or warrant; and reporting a
lost or stolen firearm to local authorities within forty-eight hours.176
Further, Judge Ripple compared an FFL holder who steals a firearm sent to
him for repair to “an ordinary bank teller”177 who steals a customer’s
deposit instead of placing it in the till.178 In the case of the bank teller, the
teller holds no element of discretionary judgment that would allow him to
properly explain the absence of the deposit.179 Similarly, the FFL holder
maintains no discretionary judgment that would allow him to properly
explain the absence of the firearm.180 Finally, Judge Ripple compared the
FFL to a driver’s license; even though a driver’s license gives its holder the
opportunity to commit offenses, the government does not give a driver
“substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable
deference” just by issuing a driver’s license.181 Instead, a driver’s license
holder subjects himself to extensive government oversight and, therefore,
lacks a position of trust.182
In sum, Judge Ripple’s concurrence in Podhorn provides a thoughtful
example of a professional discretion approach to § 3B1.3 determinations.
Had Judge Ripple applied a tri-part access and authority, difficult-to-detect,
and professional discretion hybrid, the outcome may have been different.183
A few months later, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with Judge Ripple’s
concurrence.184

172. Id. at 564.
173. See id. at 563.
174. See id. at 563–64.
175. Id. at 564.
176. See id.
177. Application Note One explicitly notes that an “ordinary bank teller” does not occupy a
position of trust. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2008).
178. Podhorn, 549 F.3d at 564–65 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179. Id. at 565.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 563, 565.
182. See id. at 565.
183. See infra Part V.D (discussing the application of different “public trust” tests to the
similar fact patterns set out in Louis and Starnes).
184. See infra Part V.B.
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B. United States v. Louis: The Eleventh Circuit Uses the
Professional Discretion Approach to Prevent § 3B1.3
Enhancement for a Licensed Firearm Dealer
In United States v. Louis, the ATF, using a paid informant, attempted to
purchase a firearm from the defendant, a licensed firearms dealer.185 After
meeting in a used car lot, the informant, a convicted felon, notified the
dealer of his criminal past.186 The dealer asked the informant if a non-felon
could complete the required paperwork on the informant’s behalf.187 Days
later, the informant returned with an undercover agent, who completed the
paperwork. The dealer gave the informant a firearm.188 A month later, the
ATF again arranged for a paid informant to visit the dealer.189 This time,
the informant arrived with an undercover agent.190 When the informant
told the dealer of his criminal history, the dealer asked the undercover
agent to complete the paperwork.191 After completion, the dealer gave the
informant a firearm.192
After a jury conviction for two counts of selling a firearm to a convicted
felon, the presentence report recommended increasing the dealer’s offense
level two points based on § 3B1.3 for abusing a position of trust.193
Applying the presentence report’s suggestion, the sentencing judge wrote:
“[T]he public trust, in part, is that the person who is duly
licensed and empowered by the government to sell weapons
will not sell them in a manner, because they are dangerous
instrumentalities, that they will cause or are likely to cause
further harm in society, because they’re put in the hands of
people who have already shown that they cannot comply with
the rules and laws of society.”194
Further, the district court noted that “the public ‘trusted’ [the dealer] ‘to
be the first line of defense in preventing criminals from accessing
dangerous weapons.’”195 The judge sentenced the dealer to twenty-seven
months in prison and two years of supervised release,196 a noticeable
increase in the basic charge due to sentence enhancements.197 On appeal,
185. United States v. Louis, 559 F.3d 1220, 1222 (11th Cir. 2009).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1223.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (alteration in original).
195. Id. at 1228.
196. Id. at 1223.
197. The base offense level was fourteen. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2K2.1(a)(6)(B) (2009). The Guidelines call for an upward enhancement of two points because the
dealer agreed to sell the first informant five additional firearms. See id. § 2K2.1(a)(6)(B), (b)(1)(A).
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the Eleventh Circuit reversed the public trust decision.198 Relying on Judge
Ripple’s concurrence in United States v. Podhorn, Judge William Pryor
concluded that “[b]ecause . . . dealers are closely regulated and do not
exercise the substantial discretion necessary for a position of public trust,
we hold that those licensees are not subject to the abuse-of-trust
enhancement.”199 The Eleventh Circuit flatly rejected the “first line of
defense” reasoning and noted the district court’s lack of analysis about the
discretion exercised by firearm dealers.200 Applied to its end, the district
court’s reasoning would subject nearly all convicted defendants to
§ 3B1.3’s enhancement because for every crime, the public, in some way,
trusts one who commits the crime.
Again relying on Podhorn, the court reasoned that, to occupy a position
of trust, three factors should be considered: professional judgment,
discretion, and deference.201 While FFL holders exercise a significant
amount of social responsibility, social responsibility does not imply
professional discretion.202 The court also rejected the government’s
argument that because Louis was unsupervised, Louis received substantial
deference.203 In doing so, the court highlighted the periodic inspection that
immediately proceeded Louis’s arrest: “[W]ere it not for this close
regulation and supervision, Louis’s crime would likely have gone
undetected.”204 Given the longer history of the Eleventh Circuit’s
application of the professional discretion approach,205 the Louis decision
comes as less of a surprise than the Podhorn concurrence.
C. United States v. Starnes: The Third Circuit Applies a Hybrid
Approach to Impose § 3B1.3 Enhancement to an Asbestos
Removal Subcontractor
In United States v. Starnes,206 a factually analogous case to Louis and
Podhorn, the Third Circuit reached a different conclusion by finding that
an asbestos removal subcontractor occupies a position of trust.207 Starnes,
the owner of a demolition company, subcontracted under the Virgin Islands
Housing Authority (VIHA) to conduct asbestos-related demolition.208 The
project specifications provided that subcontractors were to perform all

Plus, another upward enhancement of two points derived from the dealer abusing a position of trust.
See id. § 3B1.3. As a result, the new offense level was eighteen.
198. Louis, 559 F.3d at 1225.
199. Id. at 1222.
200. Id. at 1228.
201. Id. at 1227.
202. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2009).
203. Louis, 559 F.3d at 1228.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 122 F.3d 1360, 1365–66 (11th Cir. 1997).
206. 583 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2009).
207. Id. at 217 (“[W]e conclude that the District Court correctly determined that Starnes was in
a position of trust.”).
208. Id. at 202.
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work in strict accordance with all federal, state, and local regulations.209 As
a former asbestos demolition course instructor, Starnes understood the
asbestos abatement procedures and regulations.210 During the first month
of the project, Starnes fell two weeks behind on the VIHA’s mandatory
daily air-monitoring reports.211 In response, VIHA sent Starnes a
noncompliance notice.212 The following day, VIHA received twelve signed
air-monitoring reports from Starnes, attesting that he analyzed the daily air
samples at the site.213 A week later, an air quality specialist with the Virgin
Islands Department of Planning and Natural Resources (DPNR) visited the
site and noted deplorable conditions, including workers covered in white
powder and visible emissions rising from asbestos-laden ceiling tiles.214
DPNR issued a stop work order and referred the matter to the EPA.215
After an EPA investigation that revealed falsified air-monitoring reports, a
jury convicted Starnes under the Clean Air Act with three counts of
knowingly violating EPA standards for the handling of regulated asbestos
and twelve counts of falsifying air-monitoring reports.216
On appeal, Starnes contended that the district court erred by finding that
he occupied a position of trust under § 3B1.3.217 Upholding the decision of
the district court, the court explained the Third Circuit’s position of trust
approach as follows:
In deciding whether a defendant holds a position of trust, a
court must consider: “(1) whether the position allows the
defendant to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the
degree of authority which the position vests in [the] defendant
vis-á-vis the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there
has been reliance on the integrity of the person occupying the
position.”218
First, the court noted that, as the owner of the company, Starnes was
subject to very little supervision and therefore held substantial “managerial
discretion.”219 Accordingly, this discretion facilitated Starnes’s crimes and
made them “difficult-to-detect.”220 Second, the court concluded that in that
same role, Starnes held “significant authority” over the work at the jobsite,
including authority over air monitoring.221 Finally, the court noted that
209. Id.
210. Id. at 203.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 204–05.
217. Id. at 217.
218. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1192 (3d
Cir. 1994)).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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VIHA relied on Starnes to accurately report the levels of asbestos at the
jobsite.222 Thus, the Third Circuit imposed the enhancement.223
D. Comparing Louis and Starnes
Although the Starnes opinion lacks an exhaustive analysis of the issue,
it highlights some key differences between the approaches of the Third and
Eleventh Circuits. As mentioned at the beginning of this Note, the facts of
Starnes and Louis are strikingly similar.224 Therefore, if the Third Circuit
faced the facts presented in Louis, the court would probably have applied
the enhancement. First, Louis, just like Starnes, owned and operated his
business and, therefore, was subject to no direct supervision. Therefore,
Louis maintained “managerial discretion,” and this discretion made Louis’s
illegal sales difficult to detect. In fact, Louis’s dealings may have been
more inconspicuous than Starnes’s dealings. Although Starnes was
required to submit air-monitoring reports to the DPNR, VIHA, and EPA,
Louis needed to submit documents to the ATF only. Second, Louis, as a
sole proprietor and firearm dealer, held “significant authority” over the
business, including the choice of whether to sell a firearm to a felon. Third,
just like the VIHA “relied on” Louis to make accurate air-monitoring
reports, the ATF, the federal government, and society-at-large relied on
Louis to be a “gatekeeper” of dangerous firearms.
Conversely, if the Eleventh Circuit faced the facts presented in Starnes,
the court would probably not apply the § 3B1.3 enhancement. Under the
Louis rationale, the Eleventh Circuit evaluates the enhancement based on
professional judgment, discretion, and deference from the perspective of
the victim. Under the Starnes facts, the government, as a representative of
the people, is the victim of fraudulent air-monitoring reports. Although the
government allowed Starnes to exercise significant professional judgment
as the owner of his business, the government allowed Starnes little
discretion or deference in regard to asbestos air monitoring. Instead, the
EPA set specific work-practice standards for the handling of asbestosrelated materials and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) obligated asbestos contractors to monitor jobsite air samples.
Additionally, the asbestos air-monitoring reports were subject to oversight
by four government agencies: DPNR, EPA, OSHA, and VIHA. Hence, the
lack of professional discretion given by the government to Starnes likely
fails to implicate Starnes under the Eleventh Circuit’s § 3B1.3
enhancement approach.
VI. PROGRESSING TOWARD DISCRETION: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE
PROFESSIONAL DISCRETION APPROACH
Since the enactment of the Guidelines twenty years ago, courts have
struggled to find a consistent definition for a position of trust under
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 15–21.
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§ 3B1.3. As Starnes and Louis demonstrate, the application of different
approaches often leads to different results.225 In light of the recent United
States v. Contreras226 decision and the plain text of Application Note One
as amended in 1993, the remaining courts should adopt the professional
discretion approach exclusively.
A. United States v. Contreras: The Ninth Circuit Rejects the
Difficult-to-Detect Approach
In 2009, the Ninth Circuit explicitly overruled United States v. Hill, the
genesis of the difficult-to-detect approach.227 In United States v. Contreras,
the defendant, a cook at a California state prison, pled guilty to one count
of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance.228
Before the defendant entered the prison each day, prison officials
administered a cursory search of her person.229 At work, Contreras had
unmonitored contact with prisoners in the kitchen.230 Relying on these
liberties, Contreras used tea cans inside her lunch box to smuggle drugs
into the prison.231 Pursuant to the recommendation of the presentencing
report, the sentencing court included a two level enhancement for violating
a position of trust under § 3B1.3.232 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit pointed to
the text of § 3B1.3’s Application Note One, the 1993 guideline
amendments, and the resulting confusion in its own case law, and
concluded that the Hill difficult-to-detect approach should never have
survived the 1993 amendments.233
Prior to the 1993 amendments, § 3B1.3’s Application Note One read
that the position “must have contributed in some substantial way to
facilitating the crime and not merely have provided an opportunity that
could as easily have been afforded to other persons.”234 However, in 1993,
in order to “better distinguish cases warranting this enhancement,”235 the
Commission amended Application Note One to read: “‘Public or private
trust’ refers to a position of public or private trust characterized by
professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary
judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference). Persons holding
such positions ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than
employees whose responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in
nature.”236
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See supra notes 1–21 and accompanying text.
581 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1164–65.
Id. at 1164.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1165–66.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (1990).
Id. at app. C, amend. 492 (effective Nov. 1, 1993).
Id. (emphasis added).
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Drawing on the text of the amendment and reasoning from other circuit
courts, the Ninth Circuit struck down the difficult-to-detect approach that it
had created and followed for nearly twenty years: “Whereas Hill assessed
whether a defendant had the ‘freedom’ to commit a crime without ‘quick
notice,’ the commentary instead emphasizes ‘professional or managerial
discretion.’”237 The court also noted the evident confusion in its case law
since 1993 as it attempted to reconcile the difficult-to-detect approach with
the amendment’s professional discretion approach: “Continued use of the
Hill test after 1993 has swept up bank tellers, post office clerks, and supply
officers in the enhancement—though none held a position of ‘professional
or managerial discretion.’”238 With Contreras, the Ninth Circuit joined the
First,239 Sixth,240 Eighth,241 Tenth,242 Eleventh,243 and District of Columbia
Circuits244 in applying the professional discretion approach exclusively.245
While Contreras is binding only in the Ninth Circuit, it has nationwide
significance. First, it overrules Hill, which stood for nearly twenty years as
the leading case for defining a position of trust. Second, Hill created the
difficult-to-detect approach that other circuit courts subsequently employed
in their opinions.246 Thus, Contreras calls much of the § 3B1.3 position of
trust jurisprudence into serious question.
B. The Plain Text of the Commission’s 1993 Amendment to
Application Note One
With the enactment of the Guidelines in 1990, Congress and the
Commission gave little guidance to the courts on how to define a position
of trust under § 3B1.3.247 The position only needed to “have contributed in
some substantial way to facilitating the crime and not merely have
provided an opportunity that could as easily have been afforded to other
persons.”248 The Commission’s broad definition understandably led to
varying approaches and outcomes amongst the circuit courts.249 Out of
237. Contreras, 581 F.3d at 1166 (internal citation omitted).
238. Id. at 1167.
239. See United States v. Reccko, 151 F.3d 29, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1998).
240. See United States v. Tribble, 206 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 2000).
241. See United States v. Trice, 245 F.3d 1041, 1042 (8th Cir. 2001).
242. See United States v. Spear, 491 F.3d 1150, 1154 (10th Cir. 2007).
243. See United States v. Louis, 559 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2009).
244. United States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
245. United States v. Contreras, 581 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part by 593
F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (agreeing with the original three-judge panel that
ruled United States v. Hill and its progeny should be overruled).
246. See supra Part IV.B.
247. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (1990). The Guidelines
commentary binds the courts unless it violates federal law, is inconsistent with the Guidelines
themselves, or is based upon a plainly erroneous reading of a guideline provision. See Stinson v.
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42–43 (1993).
248. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (1990).
249. See Hendricks, supra note 111, at 176.
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§ 3B1.3’s original definition, today’s three most popular approaches were
born.250
However, in 1993, the Commission amended Application Note One to
emphasize professional or managerial discretion: “‘Public or private trust’
refers to a position of public or private trust characterized by professional
or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is
ordinarily given considerable deference).”251 Recognizing the gross
inconsistencies between circuits in 1993, the Commission sought to
“reformulate[] the definition of an abuse of position of trust to better
distinguish cases warranting [the § 3B1.3] enhancement.”252 Accordingly,
the Application Note explicitly mentions “professional or managerial
discretion” and intentionally omits explicit mention of “access and
authority” or “difficult-to-detect,” despite the latter standards’ existence at
the time.253 Of the many approaches available in 1993,254 the Commission
chose to mention only “professional or managerial discretion” in the
Amendment.255 Thus, in its 1993 Amendment, the Commission implicitly
approved of the professional discretion approach to § 3B1.3 enhancements.
As noted in Contreras, despite the text’s plain meaning, many courts
continued to adhere to their previous approaches “without addressing or
analyzing the change in the law.”256 Contreras admonished courts in the
Ninth Circuit because instead of addressing the difficult-to-detect approach
in 1993, many courts failed to analyze the effect of the amended
commentary and to acknowledge that the difficult-to-detect approach
preceded the amendments.257 Thus, the Ninth Circuit essentially ignored
the 1993 Amendment for sixteen years until its Contreras decision adopted
the professional discretion approach.258
C. The Faulty Legal Grounding of the Hybrid Approach
In 2007, in United States v. Spear,259 the Tenth Circuit rejected its
hybrid approach along with a § 3B1.3 enhancement for a federal
immigration official convicted of embezzling government funds.260
Significantly, in its adoption of the professional discretion approach, the
250. See supra Part IV.
251. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2007) (emphasis added).
252. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 492 (effective Nov. 1, 1993).
253. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2007).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 966 F.2d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1992) (employing
hybrid approach); United States v. Brelsford, 982 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1992) (employing the
access and authority approach); United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990) (employing
the difficult-to-detect approach).
255. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2009).
256. United States v. Contreras, 581 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2009) , vacated in part by 593
F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (agreeing with the original three-judge panel that
ruled United States v. Hill and its progeny should be overruled).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. 491 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2007).
260. Id. at 1152.
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court rejected the prosecution’s citation to pre-amendment authority:
The government relies in part on our 1992 decision in United
States v. Williams, 966 F.2d 555 (10th Cir. 1992), which
identifies several factors to consider in applying the abuse of
trust enhancement. That decision, however, predated the
significant modifications in [Application Note One] that the
United States Sentencing Commission adopted in 1993. . . . In
light of the 1993 amendments, Williams is of limited
significance when evaluating [§] 3B1.3.261
As Spear implies, after the amendment, the circuit courts should have
reevaluated their approaches to defining a position of trust.262
However, three circuits have yet to analyze the amendment’s effect.
Similar to the Ninth Circuit before Contreras and the Tenth Circuit before
Spear, all three of those circuits rely on pre-amendment case law to justify
their approaches. For example, in the Third Circuit’s first abuse of trust
decision after the amendment, United States v. Pardo,263 the court failed to
analyze critically the amendment’s changes. Instead of refocusing its
analysis on the Commission’s guidance in the new amendment, the court
emphasized its own pre-amendment case law:
Culling these principles from our cases, it follows that in
considering whether a position constitutes a position of trust
for purposes of § 3B1.3, a court must consider: (1) whether
the position allows the defendant to commit a difficult-todetect wrong; (2) the degree of authority which the position
vests in defendant vis-a-vis [sic] the object of the wrongful
act; and (3) whether there has been reliance on the integrity of
the person occupying the position.264
Despite the announcement of the Commission’s new definition just six
months prior, Pardo relegates analysis of the amendment to one brief
footnote and fails to use the amendment to redefine a position of trust.265
Unfortunately, as the Third Circuit’s original interpretation of the
amendment, Pardo stands as its precedential case. Thus, the Third
Circuit’s § 3B1.3 jurisprudence relies on a decision that ignored the
Commission’s definition of position of trust as announced in the
amendment.
261. Id. at 1154 n.2. Despite Spear, two 2008 Tenth Circuit abuse of trust cases reverted back
to the hybrid approach. See United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106, 1118 (10th Cir. 2008). Both cases prominently cited pre-amendment
case law without explanation. See Gallant, 537 F.3d at 1244; Chee, 514 F.3d at 1118.
262. See Spear, 491 F.3d at 1154 n.2.
263. 25 F.3d 1187 (3d Cir. 1994).
264. Id. at 1192 (emphasis added).
265. See id. at 1191 & n.3.
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The Second Circuit has also ignored the 1993 Amendment. In 1994, in
its leading case, United States v. Viola,266 the court established the
difficult-to-detect approach as an element in its own hybrid approach by
citing its own pre-amendment case law.267 Similarly, in the Fourth
Circuit’s leading abuse of trust case, United States v. Gordon,268 the court
cited four different pre-amendment cases to establish its four-factor hybrid
of (1) access and authority; (2) professional discretion; (3) difficult-todetect; and (4) culpability.269
As the cases above illustrate, all hybrid approaches presently in use
originated from cases that preceded the amendment or failed to analyze its
effect. Because the amendment significantly changed § 3B1.3’s position of
trust definition, the hybrid approach sits on faulty legal ground. Thus, the
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits should follow Contreras and Spear and
abandon their hybrid approaches.
VII. CONCLUSION
By exclusively evaluating whether a defendant’s criminal opportunity
arose as a result of substantial discretionary judgment given by the victim,
the professional discretion approach best captures the will of the
Commission in its 1993 Amendment. Since the amendment, most circuit
courts have slowly adopted this approach to define a position of trust. In
order to further promote Congress’s goal of reasonably uniform sentencing,
the remaining courts should adopt the professional discretion approach for
§ 3B1.3 sentencing.

266. 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994).
267. Id. at 45 (citing United States v. Castagnet, 936 F.2d 57, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1991)).
268. 61 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 1995).
269. Id. at 269 (citing United States v. Smaw, 993 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir.1993); United
States v. Queen, 4 F.3d 925, 928–29 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 904, 916
(10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 505–06 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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